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. REHABILITATING FEDERALISM 
Erwin Chemerinsky* 
To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERAL-
ISM. By Samuel H. Beer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
1993. Pp. xxi, 474. $29.95. 
Historically, federalism has appeared in political debate primarily 
as an argument to support conservative causes. During the early nine-
teenth century, for example, John Calhoun argued that states had in-
dependent sovereignty and could interpose their authority between the 
federal government and the people to nullify federal actions restricting 
slavery (p. 224). Similarly, during Reconstruction, southern states 
claimed that the federal military presence was incompatible with state 
sovereignty and federalism. 1 
In the early twentieth century, opponents of federal legislation suc-
cessfully used federalism as the basis for challenging laws regulating 
child labor, imposing the minimum wage, and protecting consumers.2 
During the Depression, conservatives objected to many of President 
Franklin Roosevelt's proposals, such as social security, on the ground 
that they usurped functions properly left to state governments. 3 
During the 1950s and 1960s, those objecting to federal civil rights 
efforts phrased their protests primarily in terms of federalism. 
Southerners challenged Supreme Court decisions mandating desegre-
gation and objected to proposed federal civil rights legislation by res-
urrecting the arguments of John Calhoun. Proponents defended 
segregation and discrimination less on the grounds that they were de-
sirable practices and more in terms of the states' rights to choose their 
own laws concerning race relations.4 
• Legion Lex Professor of Law, University of Southern California. B.S. 1975, Northwest-
ern; J.D. 1978, Harvard. - Ed. 
1. For example, in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), the Supreme 
Court narrowly construed the Reconstruction-era amendments, based in part on federalism con-
siderations. Notably, the Court gave the Privileges or Immunities Clause an extremely narrow 
construction because of its belief that the provision was not intended to alter federal-state rela-
tions. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 74-80. 
2. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating the federal regula-
tion of employment, including a minimum wage); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) 
(invalidating the federal regulation of child labor), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 
100 (1941); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding that the Sherman 
Antitrust Act could not be applied to businesses engaged in production). 
3. See, e.g .• WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE GLORY AND THE DREAM 137 (1974) ("To the 
conservative justices, apparently, any federal participation in local problems was forbidden."). 
4. Cf. pp. 20-21 (discussing the "compact model," in which states and nation are separate 
political communities). 
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In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan proclaimed a "new federal-
ism" as the basis for attempting to dismantle federal social welfare 
programs (p. 2). In his first presidential inaugural address, President 
Reagan said that he sought to "restor[e] the balance between ... levels 
of government."5 His administration thus employed federalism as its 
rationale for cutting back on countless federal programs. 
Hindsight reveals that federalism has primarily been an argument 
conservatives have used to resist progressive federal efforts, especially 
in the areas of civil rights and social welfare. There is, of course, noth-
ing inherent in federalism that makes it conservative. In recent years, 
for example, prominent liberals, such as Justice William Brennan, 
have argued that there should be more use of state constitutions to 
protect individual liberties. 6 
What is striking, however, about the historical use of federalism 
arguments is that the discussions are very much value-laden. Advo-
cates debate important issues of national policy in terms of the proper 
allocation of power between the federal and state governments. 
Yet, each year as I teach constitutional law and specifically the 
material about federalism, I am struck by the absence of discussion 
about underlying values in the material. Supreme Court decisions 
about federalism rarely do more than offer slogans about the impor-
tance of autonomous state governments. Occasionally, the Court will 
mention that states are important as laboratories of ideas or that state 
governments are crucial as a check on the tyranny of the national 
political govemment.7 Never, though, is there much elaboration of 
the values of federalism, and rarely is there any explanation of how the 
values of federalism relate to the Court's holdings. For example, in its 
1992 decision in New York v. United States, 8 the Supreme Court relied 
on federalism and the Tenth Amendment to invalidate a provision of 
federal law.9 Yet the Court provided little discussion about why a 
federal statute requiring states to dispose safely of nuclear wastes un-
dermined important values of federalism. 
Indeed, I believe that, of all of the areas of constitutional law, it is 
in discussions about federalism that the underlying values are least 
discussed and most disconnected from the legal doctrines. In separa-
tion-of-powers cases, courts frequently give explicit consideration to 
the tension between accountability and fiexibility. 10 In dormant com-
5. Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address, PUB. PAPERS 1, 3 (Jan. 20, 1981). 
6. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
7. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2399-400 (1991) (discussing the value of 
federalism in checking national power). 
8. 112 s. Ct. 2408 (1992). 
9. 112 S. Ct. at 2428-29. 
10. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 1002 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing in 
favor of the legislative veto based on the importance of checks and balances); United States v. 
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merce clause cases, courts often weigh the importance of a national 
market economy unrestricted by protectionist state laws.11 In equal 
protection cases, courts eloquently speak of the need for racial and 
gender equality.12 In procedural due process cases, courts identify and 
expressly balance the underlying values of accurate decisionmaking, 
individual interests, and government efficiency.13 In freedom of 
speech cases, courts constantly discuss the value of expression and the 
dangers of government censorship.14 But where in federalism cases is 
there any careful exploration of why state autonomy matters and how 
specific federal actions undermine it? 
In fact, post·1937 Supreme Court decisions concerning federalism 
have been paradoxical. The Supreme Court has aggressively used fed· 
eralism as the basis for limiting federaljudicial power, but has almost 
completely refused to employ federalism to limit federal legislative 
power. This approach to federalism persisted almost unchanged for 
fifty.five years, from 1937 until 1992, with the Court declaring only 
one federal statute unconstitutional on federalism grounds, and that 
case - National League of Cities v. Usery - the Court later expressly 
overruled.15 During this same period, however, the Court has fre· 
quently used federalism as the basis for limiting federal judicial power 
- for example, by requiring abstention, 16 expanding the scope of the 
Eleventh Amendment and state immunity to federal court litigation,17 
and limiting the scope of federal habeas corpus review. 18 
I sketch this history because it is only against this backdrop that 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-21 (1936) (discussing the importance of accord-
ing the President broad powers in the area of foreign policy). 
11. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (discussing the harms 
of protectionist state legislation); H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (same). 
12. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (gender equality); Brown v. Board 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racial equality). 
13. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-35 (1976) (articulating the balancing 
test for procedural due process). For an application of the Mathews balancing test, see Connecti-
cut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991) (requiring procedural due process for prejudgment attachments). 
14. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 761-65 (1976) (explaining the importance of protecting commercial speech); New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (explaining the importance of protecting criti-
cism of the government and government officials); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (eloquently explaining the rationale for protecting speech); 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (articulating the 
market-of-ideas rationale for freedom of speech). 
15. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 
528 (1985). 
16. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (using "Our Federalism" as the basis for 
requiring federal courts to abstain when there is a pending state court criminal proceeding). 
17. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (using state sovereignty and the Elev-
enth Amendment as the basis for limiting federal court jurisdiction to hear suits against state 
governments). 
18. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (preventing federal habeas corpus 
petitions when there is a procedural default in state court). 
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one can evaluate Professor Samuel H. Beer's19 new book on federal-
ism. Beer's central thesis is that history supports expansive national 
powers and refutes the view that states retain substantial sovereignty. 
In a brilliant exploration of history, starting with Thomas Aquinas 
and continuing through the Framers' views, Beer seeks to demonstrate 
that federalism need not be viewed solely as a conservative or regres-
sive concept. Quite the contrary, Beer's express goal is to "rediscover" 
federalism as a source for progress and for the protection of individual 
rights. There is no doubt that Beer has made a major contribution to 
the literature on the subject. 
Whether Beer succeeds, however, depends on how his audience 
views his goal. If one reads his book looking to gain a better under-
standing of the origins of American federalism, the book is a tremen-
dous success. It is clearly written, impeccably documented, and 
extremely persuasive. Moreover, if one wants to refute conservatives' 
claims that the origins of the doctrine justify their view of federalism, 
Beer's book is invaluable. 
On the other hand, Beer's book is much less helpful if one is look-
ing for insights as to how political and legal analysts have actually 
used federalism since 1787. The introductory chapter sketches a brief 
history of federalism since the Constitutional Convention, focusing on 
issues raised by slavery, by the industrial revolution, and by the civil 
rights movemenf (pp. 8-20). Beyond that, however, and the discussion 
of the values ·of federalism iri the last chapter (pp. ·382-92), the book's 
focus is entirely historical. Thus, Beer's book is of limited benefit for 
approaching the issues specific to federalism that will confront govern-
ment in the future. Rather, it is almost entirely about the intellectual 
foundations of. federalism prior to the beginning of American 
government. · 
Generally, it would be unfair to criticize a work of history for not 
being "relevant" to later issues. However, Beer invites this reaction 
with his preface and first chapter. There he begins by quoting Ronald 
Reagan's view of federalism as American government being a compact 
among the states (p. 2). In large part, the book is a thorough - in-
deed, brilliant - refutation of that view based on the historical origins 
of federalism. 
Yet, I question whether one can challenge a contemporary view 
solely based on historical evidence. Two hundred years of American 
experience are far more important in understanding the content of fed-
eralism than are the views of those who died long before the Constitu-
tion was drafted. 
Therefore, I am left with a mixed reaction to Beer's book. As a 
work of constitutional history, the book is flawless. Beer unquestiona-
19. Eaton Professor of the Science of Government, Emeritus, Harvard University. 
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bly succeeds in refuting any historical claim that we should view 
American democracy as a compact among the states. The book, how-
ever, cannot accomplish all that Beer seeks. As a basis for modem 
analysis about federalism issues, the book's value is inherently very 
limited. This, of co~se, is only a criticism to the extent that the book 
seeks to provide a basis for contemporary analysis of federalism issues. 
This review is divided into three Parts. Part I briefly describes 
Beer's analysis. Part II explains why his historical exploration is of 
limited benefit for understanding federalism issues as they have oc-
curred over the course of American history. Finally, Part III consid-
ers aspects of Beer's book that offer insights warranting further 
development in dealing with federalism issues. 
By federalism, I simply mean the allocation of power between the 
federal and state governments. More specifically, federalism, as used 
throughout this review, refers to the extent to. which consideration of 
state government autonomy has been and should be used as a limit on 
federal power.20 Of course, this is not the only meaning of federalism 
or the only relevance of federalism considerations in American gov-
ernment. It is, however, the definition of federalism that is implicit in 
Beer's book. 
I. PROFESSOR BEER'S HISTORY 
.. ' . ~ 
Except for the first and last chapters, Beer's book is a history of the 
ideas that formed the basis for American federalism. The book is or-
ganized into three ·parts.- The first part looks at the writings of 
Thomas Aquinas, Jolin Milton, and Jam'es Harrington (pp. 31-131). 
Beer contends that Aquinas's philosophy was the intellectual justifica-
tion for monarchy. As such; it was this philosophy, above all, that 
American government rejected: Beer, after describing Aquinas's polit-
ical theory, states: "Th[e] double work of destroying the old doctrines 
of virtue and grace and conceiving a new rationale for authority and 
purpose laid the intellectual foundations for the American republic" 
(pp. 64-65). 
Beer suggests that John Milton's emphasis on government by dis-
cussion provided a key foundation for the American republic. Milton 
saw individuals as autonomous and isolated in a manner much differ-
ent than earlier philosophers had. Beer notes the importance of this 
autonomy: . 
This new view of the individual leads to a new view of society, his-
tory, and government. Looked at in one way, Milton's individual is 
painfully isolated. He no longer enjoys the moral and intellectual secur-
20. Federalism by this definition has both a descriptive element, referring to the extent to 
which courts have used state sovereignty as a check on federal power, and a normative applica-
tion, referring to the extent to which state sovereignty should be a limit on federal government 
authority. 
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ity that came from the deference of his inferiors and the guidance of his 
superiors. Deprived of these vertical supports of the great chain of be-
ing, he confronts the enormous questions of belief and conduct, of good 
and evil, alone with his reason and his God. On the other hand, since his 
fellows have similar powers which they are exercising in the same quest, 
he ~ and must look to them for counsel. [p. 74] 
For this reason, rational deliberation is essential, and facilitating it is a 
central function of government. 
To conclude his first part, Beer describes the contribution of James 
Harrington to American political thought. 13eer makes a compelling 
case that Harrington played a pivotal role in the ultimate scheme of 
American government. Harrington's tract, Oceana, 21 published in 
1656, strongly advocated popular government as an alternative to 
monarchy and authoritarian regimes. Beer notes that "[o]ne element 
in this constitutional order was a vertical distribution of powers be-
tween center and periphery, protected by fundamental law. This 
scheme of constitutional decentralization foreshadows the federal 
structure adopted by the Americans in 1787" (p. 85). 
Beer explains that Harrington sought to answer Machiavelli's view 
that "diversity leads to disorder and that disorder leads to tyranny" 
(p. 91). Harrington saw a solution in popular sovereignty and a feder-
alist structure of government. Beer writes: 
What the American student of federalism must find especially illumi-
nating in Harrington's thought is how vividly it brings out the national-
ist emphasis of the republican tradition. His advocacy is all the more 
convincing because he considered other possibilities. He considered and 
rejected the small state theory of republicanism advocated by 
Machiavelli. He repeatedly spumed the confederate model later popu-
larized by Montesquieu and adopted by many Anti-Federalists. [pp. 
129-30] 
The second part of the book describes republican thought as a 
feature of the revolutionary sentiment (pp. 133-214). At the outset of 
that part, Beer reminds the reader that the American rebels chose not 
only independence but democratic government as well (p. 134). This 
part of the book also explores the conflict over the appropriate nature 
of American government at the earliest stages of American history. 
Beer describes, for example, how the commitment to a republic articu-
. lated by men such as Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Paine also 
justified a centralized government (pp. 153-62). Beer explains the im-
portance of these thinkers to Framers such as Alexander Hamilton: 
"In the spirit of Franklin, Alexander Hamilton construed the constitu-
tion of 1787 in the light of the tasks of nation-building and in his pro-
phetic reports showed how an active central government could lead 
21. JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA (1656), reprinted in THE 
PoLmCAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 155 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1977). 
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the way toward making the country rich, powerful, and united" (p. 
162). 
The Framers, explains Beer, sought to assure both liberty and a 
successful union by creating a national and federal republic (p. 195). 
Beer sketches the competing philosophy of the anti-federalists that was 
founded in the writings of Montesquieu and advocated a confederate 
republic among sovereign states (pp. 219-93). Interestingly, Beer 
points out that this philosophy had few advocates before 1787 or at the 
Constitutional Convention but that the compact view of federalism 
was resurrected in the late 1780s (pp. 236-37). 
Beer then carefully reviews the writings of the Federalists, espe-
cially those of James Madison, and shows their rejection of compact 
federalism (pp. 244-307). Furthermore, the ratification of the Consti-
tution by the people supports Beer's contention that the Constitution 
is not properly regarded as a compact among the states. 22 
Beer's presentation of the history is superb. The writing is clear 
and readable; the research impeccable. Beer has written the definitive 
intellectual history of feqeralism in the United States. This review's 
brief sketch cannot begin to describe the care and nuance in his histor-
ical account of the formation of American government. 
II. THE LIMITED USEFULNESS OF PROFESSOR BEER'S HISTORY 
If Beer offered this history solely as an elucidation of the intellec-
tual foundations of American federalism, I would have little to say in 
this review. I would question the extent to which the views of Milton, 
Harrington, or Montesquieu can be attributed to the Framers simply 
because the Framers were familiar with their writings and relied upon 
some of their ideas. But this would not in any way undermme the 
value of a clear description of the intellectual foundations of 
federalism. 
Moreover, Beer seeks at the very least to refute the historical un-
derpinnings of the view that American government is best understood 
as a compact among the states. At this level, too, I have nothing but 
praise for Beer's effort. · 
Apparently, however, Beer seeks to go further than this. In the 
introduction and last chapter, Beer professes to link his historical anal-
ysis to modem debates about federalism. In the introduction he 
writes: "Whether one is trying to say what is the law of American 
federalism or what is the proper use to be made of that law, one can 
hardly arrive at an unambiguous conclusion without explicitly or im-
plicitly supplementing the argument by drawing on. a framework of 
22. This, of course, was the approach taken by Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). According to Marshall, the people, and not the states, 
created the national government by approving the Constitution, and thus the people, and not the 
states, retain ultimate sovereignty. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402-05. 
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theory" (p. 23). Beer sees history as providing that theory, explicitly 
believing that his "reconstruction of nationalist thought presents ... a 
past which is usable today" (p. 25). 
It is at this level - in the linkage of his historical analysis to mod-
em issues concerning federalism - that I question Beer's conclusions. 
First, an understanding of American federalism is impossible without 
a view to the experiences of the two hundred years since the framing of 
the Constitution. As a matter of intellectual history, the constant 
presence of the compact view lends it credibility, regardless of the 
views of the Framers Beer quotes. In other words, Beer implicitly as-
sumes that compact theory depends on historical authenticity for its 
legitimacy. However, one can justify the theory as a viable conception 
of American government by defending its normative desirability en-
tirely apart from its historical pedigree. 
Moreover, American experiences since 1787, much more than 
those earlier, are a powerful refutation of compact theory. Most nota-
bly, the Civil War and the constitutional amendments that followed it 
dramatically changed the conception of the relationship of the federal 
and state govemments.23 More recently, the assertion of compact the-
ory by southern states seeking to avoid desegregation was dramatically 
unsuccessful. The repeated rejection of compact federalism since 1787 
is a powerful argument against it, if it is to be evaluated from a histori-
cal perspective. 
Beer clearly recognizes the importance of these intervening events. 
In the introduction, he suggests that the national idea confronted three 
great trials: "the trial of sectionalism, culminating in the Civil War; 
the trial of industrialism, culminating in the great depression and the 
New Deal; and the trial of racism, which continues to rack our coun-
try today."24 Although it might have required another book, I wish 
that Beer had done more to describe the relationship of these events to 
his theory. They, much more than the intellectual history that pre-
ceded the Constitution, shaped the modem theory and practice of 
federalism. 
Moreover, I question whether the debate between the national and 
compact views of federalism is at the core of contemporary disputes 
over federalism. The central federalism issue in modem constitutional 
law is whether, and to what extent, state sovereignty limits federal 
powers.25 Is there a zone of activities assigned to the states for their 
exclusive control? Do some federal actions unduly interfere with state 
sovereignty? 
The answers to these questions are rarely put in terms of compact 
federalism. Indeed, even those completely persuaded by Beer's refuta-
23. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 81-104 (1991), 
24. P. 8; see also ACKERMAN, supra note 23, at 58-59. 
25. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2417-19 (1992). 
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tion of the historical pedigree of compact federalism still could defend 
state sovereignty as an important value. They could justify the need to 
protect state governments from congressional overreaching based on 
the values served by federalism and the benefits gained by vigilant pro-
tection of state sovereignty.26 . 
Moreover, a central question is whether the paradox of modem 
federalism since 1937 - federalism as a limit on the federaljudicial 
power but not on the federal legislative power - is justified. This cru-
cial question cannot be answered in historical terms: The professed 
justifications for deferring to state courts, especially the reliance on 
comity and parity as reasons for limits on federal judicial power, do 
not depend on acceptance of the compact theory of federalism.27 
Simply put, the scholarly literature of the 1980s persuasively dem-
onstrates the limited usefulness of originalist approaches to constitu-
tional interpretation.28 These criticisms apply equally to any attempt 
to use Beer's analysis as a basis for contemporary constitutional deci-
sionmaking. Did the Framers really have one view, or were there 
many views not captured in the Federalists' perspective? Why should 
the Framers' conception of federalism be controlling, even if it is 
knowable? Serious questions remain about using Beer's historical 
analysis - or any purely historical analysis - to draw conclusions in 
the modem constitutional debates. 
III. PROFESSOR BEER'S CONTRIBUTION TO MODERN ANALYSIS 
I believe that the central problem with the Supreme Court's ap-
proach to federalism is that it has treated the concept as if it were a 
rule for deciding cases rather than an important value to be weighed 
and considered in decisionmaking. When the Court has relied upon 
federalism, it has reasoned in a quite mechanical, formalistic manner. 
The Court has defined rigid categories of activities left to the states -
production in the earlier era, freedom from federal control of legisla-
tion or regulation in the modem one - and invalidated laws that in-
trude into these areas. By using this categorical approach, the Court 
has avoided careful consideration of the values of federalism. 
I believe that federalism decisions should take a different approach. 
In any case concerning federalism, the Court should explicitly identify 
26. See Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in 
Perspective, 1981 SUP. Cr. REv. 81, 97-109. See generally Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sover-
eignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. Cr. REV. 341. 
27. For a discussion of comity and parity as a basis for federal courts' decisions, see ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 1.5, at 29-33 (1989). 
28. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 204 (1980) (arguing against originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation); Ron-
ald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 471-500 (1981) (same); Larry 
Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 603 (1985) (same). 
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the values of federalism to be served - or compromised - by a par-
ticular judicial ruling. The Court also should identify the competing 
concerns and explicitly describe the basis for its ultimate balance. 
Certainly, the values of federalism can include traditionally in-
voked justifications such as limiting federal tyranny, encouraging re-
sponsive government, and protecting states as laboratories.29 I believe, 
however, that in very few cases will any of these values really be at 
issue when the Court considers the constitutionality of a federal stat-
ute or the appropriateness of a particular limit on federal court juris-
diction. It is very difficult to think of past Supreme Court cases in 
which these values really were at stake. 
Instead, I suggest that it would be desirable to expand the types of 
values of federalism that the courts consider in their weighing process. 
Here, Beer's analysis is potentially very useful. Beer articulates three 
values served by federalism (p. 386-88). One value he labels commu-
nity (p. 386). He writes: "The argument from community, which de-
scended from the political philosophy of ancient Greece through 
medieval conceptions of the organic, corporate society, had been refor-
mulated by continental thinkers such as Althusis and Bodin. This 
idealization of the small community had played no part in the thought 
of the American rebels ... " (p. 386). 
Communities have many values worth protecting. Safeguarding 
community decisionmaking enhances diversity as groups are allowed 
to decide their own nature and composition. Communities can define 
themselves to serve most effectively the needs of their members. Thus, 
the Court can ask in a particular case whether a specific federal law 
likely intrudes upon the ability of a community to define itself and, if 
so, whether another important interest justifies the federal action. 
The attention to community as a federalism concern need not be 
limited to cases concerning the Tenth Amendment and federal juris-
diction. For example, in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 30 the Court 
upheld a zoning ordinance that limited the number of unrelated indi-
viduals who could live together in the same household,31 emphasizing 
community self-determination. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 32 
however, the Court declared unconstitutional a similar restriction 
when it was applied to keep a grandmother from living with her two 
grandsons, who were first cousins. 33 The community's interest was 
the same, but the Court explained that the application of the East 
Cleveland zoning ordinance violated the constitutional right to keep 
29. For a summary of these traditional arguments, see GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONST!· 
TUTIONAL LAW 134-38 (2d ed. 1991). 
30. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
31. 416 U.S. at 2. 
32. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
33. 431 U.S. at 499. 
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the family together.34 
The value of community will need elaboration and judicial devel-
opment. It is not a value that will lead to predictable decisions. In-
stead,· it is an important consideration that the Court should expressly 
weigh in its federalism decisions. 
Beer identifies a second value of federalism: utility. He writes: 
The argument from utility had provided a rationale for the divisjon 
of authority between the colonies and Westminster when the prerevolu-
tionary debate turned to the federal option. Reflecting the way econo-
mists think . . . it was and has continued to be a sensible and practical 
premise for deciding what functions should be assigned respectively to 
central and to local governments. [pp. 386-87] 
There are some tasks that are better accomplished on a national 
scale, some that are better done at a state level, and some that are best 
handled at the local level. Undoubtedly, this should be a relevant con-
sideration in congressional decisionmaking about what federal laws'to 
enact. However, it is unclear how much weight the judiciary should 
give to utility when it evaluates the constitutionality of federal laws on 
federalism grounds. Absent a reason to distrust congressional deter-
minations, there is no reason why Congress cannot consider utility ar-
guments and give efficiency concerns their appropriate weight. 
Also, efficiency is a value the Supreme Court should consider as it 
defines the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. The Court must 
treat efficiency and utility, though, as among the values to be attained 
and not as the ultimate goals of the system. Any restriction of federal 
c9urt jurisdiction arguably enhances efficiency by decreasing federal 
court caseloads. The focus must be on the detriments of jurisdictional 
restrictions as compared with the benefits in efficiency to be gained. 
Finally, Beer suggests that liberty is a value to be gained by federal-
ism. He writes: "The argument which was foremost in the minds of 
the framers and which still holds greatest promise as a rationale for 
states is the argument from liberty" (p. 387). Federalism is most likely 
to enhance liberty when state governments expand the scope of indi-
vidual rights beyond those protected by the federal government. 35 For 
example, courts in many states have found a state constitutional right 
to substantial equality in educational funding. 36 Likewise, states have 
used their constitutions to provide more protection for speech and ad-
34. 431 U.S. at 505. 
35. See Robert N.C. Nix, Jr., Federalism in the Twenty-First Century - Individual Liberties 
in Search of a Guardian, in FEDERALISM: THE SHIFTING BALANCE 65 (Janice c. Griffith ed., 
1989) (arguing that state courts should and do exercise leadership in defining and protecting 
individual liberties as the federal courts retreat from doing so). 
36. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (finding a right to substantial equal-
ity of educational expenditures under the California state constitution), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 
(1977). . 
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ditional safeguards for privacy.37 
I believe that the values of community, utility, and liberty -
although each needs to be much more fully developed - provide a 
better basis for judicial decisionmaking than the traditional values in-
voked for federalism. The task for a court will be to analyze the extent 
to which a particular law undermines these values and then to balance 
that need against the benefits of the federal authority. In other words, 
and most important, the court's role should be to consider these values 
and countervalues expressly as they apply in particular cases. 
Consider an example: How should the Court have handled New 
York v. United States 38 under this approach? The Court would need 
to ask whether requiring state cleanup of low-level nuclear wastes in 
some way intruded upon the ability of communities to define them-
selves. It is highly doubtful that assuring the safe cleanup of hazard-
ous wastes would adversely affect community self-determination. Nor 
does it seem that the federal regulation would compromise the values 
of utility or liberty. Relying on states to ensure cleanup is probably 
more efficient than creating or relying upon federal enforcement. No 
one's liberty seems unduly restricted by mandating that states assure 
the safe disposal of nuclear wastes. 
Thus, from the perspective of the underlying values that should 
drive the new, reoriented federalism, the Court's decision in New York 
v. United States seems misguided. It is highly questionable how the 
federal law really compromised any of the important values behind 
protecting federalism. 
Discussions about community, utility, and liberty are inherently 
indeterminate, and advocates and scholars might try to use these val-
ues to argue for a particular result. But the key is that courts should 
discuss these values and expressly weigh them in the judicial decision-
making process. 
Is anything really gained by focusing on these particular values as 
opposed to the abstract statements that have long dominated discus-
sions about federalism? For several reasons, I think so. Most of all, 
the goal should be to encourage courts to consider and discuss care-
fully the values of federalism in rendering particular decisions. The 
values of community, utility, and liberty focus attention directly on 
the underlying concerns. Ideally, judicial opinions that expressly bal-
ance these considerations will be better reasoned and will provide 
more guidance to lower courts and commentators. 
Perhaps best of all, attention to the underlying values of federalism 
provides a way to end the paradox that has plagued federalism juris-
37. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (upholding a state 
constitutional right of access to shopping centers for speech, though no such right exists in the 
U.S. Constitution). 
38. 112 s. Ct. 2408 (1992). 
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prudence for fifty-five years. The rule should not be that federal laws 
are always upheld when there is a federalism challenge. Nor should it 
be a bright-line principle that all federal laws that compel state legisla-
tive or regulatory activity are unconstitutional. Rather, the Court 
should consider each federalism challenge to a federal statute individu-
ally and in each instance decide the case with careful and explicit at-
tention to the values of federalism. At the same time, the Court 
should give more attention to the values of federalism in the area of 
limits on the federal judicial power. Over time, courts probably will 
use federalism as a limit on both the federal judiciary and the federal 
legislative power in relatively rare instances. The treatment of these 
two powers, however, will be the same, and hopefully, the paradoxical 
handling of federalism issues will end. 
CONCLUSION 
The dispute over allocating power between the national and state 
governments is inherent in the constitutional design. Beer approaches 
this as a historical question. He seeks to show what view of federalism 
is preferable by reviewing the intellectual history that underlies the 
American Constitution. 
Beer's implicit assumption is that champions of states' rights be-
lieve that history justifies their position. Those who disagree with 
Beer's conclusion might accept this premise and offer a different his-
torical analysis that emphasizes the views of the anti-federalists. Al-
ternatively, and I think more profitably, they might argue that, 
regardless of history, state sovereignty is an important value that justi-
fies limiting the power of the national government. Although I agree 
with Beer's conclusions, I believe one can only justify them with nor-
mative arguments about the desirability of federalism as a constitu-
tional principle. 
Moreover, even if the debate over federalism occurs at both the 
historical and the normative level, something is missing in understand-
ing the role of federalism in American government. Federalism has 
long been a rhetorical strategy used by those who oppose particular 
federal efforts to argue against the proposed federal actions without 
addressing their merits. The opponents of abolition, or of social secur-
ity, or of civil rights advances, challenged the reforms based not on 
their intrinsic desirability but rather on the process grounds of federal-
ism. The persistence of the view that Beer seeks to refute has much 
less to do with its historical legitimacy and much more to do with its 
political usefulness. 
Perhaps, just perhaps, works like Beer's book that challenge the 
historical basis for protecting state sovereignty might also, over time, 
undermine the political persuasiveness of such appeals. Any relation-
ship between scholarly historical writings and political rhetoric is in-
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herently tenuous. But all who discuss federalism in the future - and 
especially those who ground their arguments in history - would be 
well advised to read carefully Professor Beer's masterful new book. 
